Change in openvpn[master]: Check message-id too when doing sessionid cookie
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Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld.
Hello flichtenheld,
I'd like you to do a code review.
Please visit
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email
to review the following change.
Change subject: Check message-id too when doing sessionid cookie
......................................................................
Check message-id too when doing sessionid cookie
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in rare instances.
Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/1
src/openvpn/mudp.c +3 -2
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@msg (D_MULTI_DEBUG ,"Reset packet from client, sending HMAC based reset challenge" ); } -/* Returns true if this packet should create a new session */ static bool do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
@@ -155,7 +154,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR ( &m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@msg (D_MULTI_DEBUG ,"Valid packet (%s) with HMAC challenge from peer (%s), " "accepting new connection." ,packet_opcode_name (op), peer); } +gc_free (&gc);return ret;
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +33 -1
@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ } } +/* * This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming
@@ -530,7 +531,8 @@ check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac, - int handwindow) + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) {
@@ -545,6 +547,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* same check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +11 -1
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ,/** The packet is a valid control packet with appended wrapped client key */ VERDICT_VALID_WKC_V1 , +/** the packet is valid but failed the check of being belong to the packets +* that could be in the three-handshake */ +VERDICT_INVALID_PKTID ,/** the packet failed on of the various checks */ VERDICT_INVALID };
@@ -180,17 +183,24 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 to be invalid as they are not part of the initial +* three way handshake of OpenVPN and should not create a new +* connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,hmac_ctx_t *hmac, -int handwindow); +int handwindow, +bool check_session_id_hmac);/* * Write a control channel authentication record.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +49 -2
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Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: flichtenheld.
plaisthos has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email )
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Set Ready For Review
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: flichtenheld.
Hello flichtenheld,
I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email
to look at the new patch set (#3).
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A
and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.
In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID
instead.
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/3
src/openvpn/mudp.c +3 -2
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@msg (D_MULTI_DEBUG ,"Reset packet from client, sending HMAC based reset challenge" ); } -/* Returns true if this packet should create a new session */ static bool do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
@@ -155,7 +154,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR ( &m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@msg (D_MULTI_DEBUG ,"Valid packet (%s) with HMAC challenge from peer (%s), " "accepting new connection." ,packet_opcode_name (op), peer); } +gc_free (&gc);return ret;
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +33 -1
@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ } } +/* * This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming
@@ -530,7 +531,8 @@ check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac, - int handwindow) + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) {
@@ -545,6 +547,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +8 -1
@@ -180,17 +180,24 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,hmac_ctx_t *hmac, -int handwindow); +int handwindow, +bool pkt_is_ack);/* * Write a control channel authentication record.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +68 -2
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Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
Gerrit-PatchSet: 3
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Re: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
Anything I can do to get this moving along?
Cheers,
Walter
Quoted 299 lines · plaisthos (Code Review)
Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld.
plaisthos *uploaded patch set #3* to this change.
View Change <http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email>
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP Aand all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (
P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SIDinstead.
Reported-By Walter Doekes <[email protected]...>Tested-by Walter Doekes <[email protected]...>Change-Id I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>---
Msrc/openvpn/mudp.c
Msrc/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
Msrc/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
Mtests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/3
src/openvpn/mudp.c +0
-1@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@msg (D_MULTI_DEBUG ,"Reset packet from client, sending HMAC based reset challenge" ); } -/* Returns true if this packet should create a new session */ static bool
do_pre_decrypt_check(structmulti_context*m,src/openvpn/mudp.c +2
-1@@ -155,7 +154,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);
uint8_tpkt_firstbyte= *BPTR(&m->top.c2.buf);src/openvpn/mudp.c +0
-0@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@msg(D_MULTI_DEBUG, "Valid packet (%s) with HMAC challenge from peer (%s), " "accepting new connection.",
packet_opcode_name(op), peer);
}
+gc_free(&gc);return ret;
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +33
-1@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ } } +/* * This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming @@ -530,7 +531,8 @@ check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac, - int handwindow) + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) {@@ -545,6 +547,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +6
-0@@ -180,17 +180,24 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ bool
check_session_id_hmac(structtls_pre_decrypt_state*state, const structopenvpn_sockaddr*from,hmac_ctx_t*hmac,
- int handwindow);
+ int handwindow,
+ boolpkt_is_ack);/*
* Write a control channel authentication record.tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +0
-0@@ -170,6 +170,27 @@
0x85,0xdb,0x53,0x56,0x23,0xb0,0x2e
};tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +21
-0+/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */ +const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] = { +0x28 , +0xae ,0xb9 ,0xaf ,0xe1 ,0xf0 ,0x1d ,0x79 ,0xc8 , +0x03 , +0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 , +0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x01 , +0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x02 , +0xdd ,0x85 ,0xdb ,0x53 ,0x56 ,0x23 ,0xb0 ,0x2e +}; + +/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */ +const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[] = { +0x20 , +0xae ,0xb9 ,0xaf ,0xe1 ,0xf0 ,0x1d ,0x79 ,0xc8 , +0x01 , +0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 , +0x02 +}; + +struct
tls_auth_standaloneinit_tas_auth(int key_direction)
{tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +46
-2@@ -439,7 +460,7 @@assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1 );/* This is a valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMAC id*/ -bool valid =check_session_id_hmac (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 ); +bool valid =check_session_id_hmac (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 , false);assert_false (valid);free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state);@@ -470,7 +491,7 @@ verdict =tls_pre_decrypt_lite (&tas, &state, &from, &buf);assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); -bool valid =check_session_id_hmac (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 ); +bool valid =check_session_id_hmac (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 , true);assert_true (valid);free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state);@@ -479,6 +500,50 @@hmac_ctx_free (hmac); } +static void +test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack (void **ut_state) +{ +hmac_ctx_t *hmac =session_id_hmac_init (); + +struct link_socket_actual from = {0 }; + from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =AF_INET ; + +struct tls_auth_standalone tas = {0 }; +struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state = {0 }; + +struct buffer buf =alloc_buf (1024 ); +enum first_packet_verdict verdict; + + tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_NONE ; + +buf_reset_len (&buf); +buf_write (&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id,sizeof (client_ack_123_none_random_id)); + + + verdict =tls_pre_decrypt_lite (&tas, &state, &from, &buf); +assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); + +/* should fail because it acks 2 */ +bool valid =check_session_id_hmac (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 , true); +assert_false (valid); + +/* Try test with the control with a too high message id now */ +buf_reset_len (&buf); +buf_write (&buf, client_control_none_random_id,sizeof (client_control_none_random_id)); + + verdict =tls_pre_decrypt_lite (&tas, &state, &from, &buf); +assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1 ); + +/* should fail because it has message id 2 */ + valid =check_session_id_hmac (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 , true); +assert_false (valid); + +free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state); +free_buf (&buf); +hmac_ctx_cleanup (hmac); +hmac_ctx_free (hmac); +} +static
hmac_ctx_t*init_static_hmac(void)
{tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +1
-0@@ -667,6 +732,7 @@cmocka_unit_test (test_calc_session_id_hmac_static),cmocka_unit_test (test_verify_hmac_none),cmocka_unit_test (test_verify_hmac_tls_auth), +cmocka_unit_test (test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack),cmocka_unit_test (test_generate_reset_packet_plain),cmocka_unit_test (test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth),cmocka_unit_test (test_extract_control_message)To view, visit change 1067 <http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email>. To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit settings <http://gerrit.openvpn.net/settings>.
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: plaisthos.
flichtenheld has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email )
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Patch Set 3: Code-Review-1
(1 comment)
File tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c:
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067/comment/69758acd_c7222844 :
PS3, Line 533:
Looking at the LeakSanitizer failure and the other test cases I think there is a free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); missing here.
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.
Hello flichtenheld,
I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email
to look at the new patch set (#4).
The following approvals got outdated and were removed:
Code-Review-1 by flichtenheld
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A
and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.
In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID
instead.
Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl.
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/4
src/openvpn/mudp.c +3 -2
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@msg (D_MULTI_DEBUG ,"Reset packet from client, sending HMAC based reset challenge" ); } -/* Returns true if this packet should create a new session */ static bool do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
@@ -155,7 +154,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR ( &m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@msg (D_MULTI_DEBUG ,"Valid packet (%s) with HMAC challenge from peer (%s), " "accepting new connection." ,packet_opcode_name (op), peer); } +gc_free (&gc);return ret;
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +33 -1
@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ } } +/* * This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming
@@ -530,7 +531,8 @@ check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac, - int handwindow) + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) {
@@ -545,6 +547,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +8 -1
@@ -180,17 +180,24 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,hmac_ctx_t *hmac, -int handwindow); +int handwindow, +bool pkt_is_ack);/* * Write a control channel authentication record.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +69 -8
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.
Hello flichtenheld,
I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email
to look at the new patch set (#5).
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A
and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.
In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID
instead.
Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl.
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/5
src/openvpn/mudp.c +2 -1
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR (&m->top.c2.buf);
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +35 -2
@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ }bool -check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow) +check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, +const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac, +int handwindow, +bool pkt_is_ack) {if (!from) {
@@ -512,6 +515,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +7 -1
@@ -178,14 +178,20 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow); +hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow,bool pkt_is_ack);/* * Write a control channel authentication record.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +82 -18
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: flichtenheld.
plaisthos has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email )
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Patch Set 5:
(1 comment)
File tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c:
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067/comment/95234b5f_2bb8c6f6 :
PS3, Line 533:
Quoted 1 line
Looking at the LeakSanitizer failure and the other test cases I think there is a `free_tls_pre_decry […]
Done
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.
MaxF has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email )
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Patch Set 5:
(3 comments)
Patchset:
PS5:
The change makes sense to me, just some small nitpicks. If you strongly prefer doing it this way, I'm willing to approve.
File src/openvpn/mudp.c:
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067/comment/b8f6989e_8a8a01d2 :
PS5, Line 163: msg(D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s",
: packet_opcode_name(op), peer);
This debug message may now be incorrect. The packet might have a valid SID, but a wrong packet ID.
File src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c:
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067/comment/3d6e4bec_68a33598 :
PS5, Line 518: /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */
: for (int i = 0; i < ack.len; i++)
: {
: /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the
: * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid
: * for the session */
: if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1)
: {
: return false;
: }
: }
:
: if (!pkt_is_ack)
: {
: packet_id_type message_id;
: /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */
: if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id))
: {
: return false;
: }
:
: /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the
: * three-way handshake */
: if (message_id > 1)
: {
: return false;
: }
: }Maybe nitpicky, but this seems like scope creep for this function. Now check_session_id_hmac() does more than checking the hmac. I'd prefer to extract this check to its own function, or rename this one.
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.
Hello flichtenheld,
I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email
to look at the new patch set (#6).
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A
and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.
In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID
instead.
Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl.
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/6
src/openvpn/mudp.c +4 -2
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR (&m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -159,7 +160,8 @@if (!ret) { -msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s" , +msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from" +" %s or wrong packet id" ,packet_opcode_name (op), peer); }else
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +35 -2
@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ }bool -check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow) +check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, +const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac, +int handwindow, +bool pkt_is_ack) {if (!from) {
@@ -512,6 +515,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +8 -2
@@ -178,14 +178,20 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ -bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow); +bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow,bool pkt_is_ack);/* * Write a control channel authentication record.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +82 -18
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[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveAttention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.
MaxF has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email )
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Patch Set 6: Code-Review+2
(2 comments)
File src/openvpn/mudp.c:
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067/comment/a89a1941_de7cae02 :
PS5, Line 163: msg(D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s",
: packet_opcode_name(op), peer);
Quoted 1 line
This debug message may now be incorrect. The packet might have a valid SID, but a wrong packet ID.
Done
File src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c:
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067/comment/333f0fff_e4904c7d :
PS5, Line 518: /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */
: for (int i = 0; i < ack.len; i++)
: {
: /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the
: * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid
: * for the session */
: if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1)
: {
: return false;
: }
: }
:
: if (!pkt_is_ack)
: {
: packet_id_type message_id;
: /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */
: if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id))
: {
: return false;
: }
:
: /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the
: * three-way handshake */
: if (message_id > 1)
: {
: return false;
: }
: }Quoted 1 line
Maybe nitpicky, but this seems like scope creep for this function. […]
Done
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PATCH v6 1/1 Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A
and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.
In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID
instead.
Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl.
---
This change was reviewed on Gerrit and approved by at least one developer. I request to merge it to master.
Gerrit URL: https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067
This mail reflects revision 6 of this Change.
Acked-by according to Gerrit (reflected above):
MaxF <[email protected]...>
src/openvpn/mudp.c +4 -2
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR (&m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -159,7 +160,8 @@if (!ret) { -msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s" , +msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from" +" %s or wrong packet id" ,packet_opcode_name (op), peer); }else
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +35 -2
@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ }bool -check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow) +check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, +const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac, +int handwindow, +bool pkt_is_ack) {if (!from) {
@@ -512,6 +515,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +8 -2
@@ -178,14 +178,20 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ -bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow); +bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow,bool pkt_is_ack);/* * Write a control channel authentication record.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +82 -18
158 lines not on this page · raw message
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This is somewhat beyond my pay grade, but fortunately MaxF understands these parts and has reviewed & ACKed it, and also Walter Doekes has tested that it fixes his problem scenario.
I have tested that it does not break any of my scenarios (t_client, t_server). Code looks reasonable as well.
I have changed the commit message to "... where these ids *are* 0 or 1...".
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit 518e122b42739b0dbb54e7169a8a3aadb4773125
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Tue Aug 19 23:22:09 2025 +0200
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg32626.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archivecron2 has uploaded a new patch set (#7) to the change originally created by plaisthos. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email )
The following approvals got outdated and were removed:
Code-Review+2 by MaxF
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A
and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.
In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids are 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID
instead.
Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl.
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg32626.html
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/7
src/openvpn/mudp.c +4 -2
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR (&m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -159,7 +160,8 @@if (!ret) { -msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s" , +msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from" +" %s or wrong packet id" ,packet_opcode_name (op), peer); }else
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +35 -2
@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ }bool -check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow) +check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, +const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac, +int handwindow, +bool pkt_is_ack) {if (!from) {
@@ -512,6 +515,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +8 -2
@@ -178,14 +178,20 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ -bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow); +bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow,bool pkt_is_ack);/* * Write a control channel authentication record.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +82 -18
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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403
Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
Gerrit-PatchSet: 7
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <[email protected]>
Gerrit-MessageType: newpatchset
[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archivecron2 has submitted this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email )
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A
and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.
In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids are 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID
instead.
Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl.
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg32626.html
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/mudp.c +4 -2
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR (&m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -159,7 +160,8 @@if (!ret) { -msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s" , +msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from" +" %s or wrong packet id" ,packet_opcode_name (op), peer); }else
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +35 -2
@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ }bool -check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow) +check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, +const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac, +int handwindow, +bool pkt_is_ack) {if (!from) {
@@ -512,6 +515,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +8 -2
@@ -178,14 +178,20 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ -bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow); +bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow,bool pkt_is_ack);/* * Write a control channel authentication record.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +82 -18
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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403
Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
Gerrit-PatchSet: 7
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <[email protected]>
Gerrit-MessageType: merged
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
Thanks!
Can we get this backported to 2.6 as well?
Walter
Quoted 356 lines · On 23-08-2025 18:01, cron2 (Code Review) wrote:
cron2 *submitted* this change.
View Change <http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email>
Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to
- starts on IP A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP Aand all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the default
configuration.In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid.
This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids are 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:
Packet (
P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SIDinstead.
Also remove a few duplicated
free_tls_pre_decrypt_stateintest_ssl.Reported-By Walter Doekes <[email protected]...>Tested-by Walter Doekes <[email protected]...>Change-Id I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>Acked-by MaxF <[email protected]...>Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg32626.htmlSigned-off-by Gert Doering <[email protected]...>---
Msrc/openvpn/mudp.c
Msrc/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
Msrc/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
Mtests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c4 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)src/openvpn/mudp.c +2
-1@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@* need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret =check_session_id_hmac (state, from, hmac, handwindow); +bool pkt_is_ack = (verdict ==VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); +bool ret =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);const char *peer =print_link_socket_actual (&m->top.c2.from, &gc);
uint8_tpkt_firstbyte=*BPTR(&m->top.c2.buf);src/openvpn/mudp.c +2
-1@@ -159,7 +160,8 @@if (!ret) { -msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s" , +msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM ,"Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from" +" %s or wrong packet id" ,packet_opcode_name (op), peer); }else
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +0
-0@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ }bool
-check_session_id_hmac(structtls_pre_decrypt_state*state, const structopenvpn_sockaddr*from,
-hmac_ctx_t*hmac, int handwindow) +check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(structtls_pre_decrypt_state*state,
+ const structopenvpn_sockaddr*from,
+hmac_ctx_t*hmac,
+ int handwindow,
+ boolpkt_is_ack)
{
if (!from)
{src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +30
-0@@ -512,6 +515,36 @@return false; } +/* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <= 1 */ +for (int i =0 ; i < ack.len; i++) + { +/* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the +* ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid +* for the session */ +if (ack.packet_id[i] >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +if (!pkt_is_ack) + { +packet_id_type message_id; +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id (&buf, &message_id)) + { +return false; + } + +/* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the +* three-way handshake */ +if (message_id >1 ) + { +return false; + } + } + +/* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =-2 ; offset <=1 ; offset++) {src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +8
-2@@ -178,14 +178,20 @@/** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * +* This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher +* than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are +* not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should +* not create a new connection. +* * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time +* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ -bool check_session_id_hmac (struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, -hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow); +bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, +hmac_ctx_t *hmac,int handwindow,bool pkt_is_ack);/*
* Write a control channel authentication record.tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +21
-0@@ -139,6 +139,27 @@0xc8 ,0x01 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0xdd ,0x85 , 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e }; +/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */ +const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] = { +0x28 , +0xae ,0xb9 ,0xaf ,0xe1 ,0xf0 ,0x1d ,0x79 ,0xc8 , +0x03 , +0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 , +0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x01 , +0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x02 , +0xdd ,0x85 ,0xdb ,0x53 ,0x56 ,0x23 ,0xb0 ,0x2e +}; + +/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */ +const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[] = { +0x20 , +0xae ,0xb9 ,0xaf ,0xe1 ,0xf0 ,0x1d ,0x79 ,0xc8 , +0x01 , +0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 ,0x00 , +0x02 +}; + +struct
tls_auth_standaloneinit_tas_auth(int key_direction)
{tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +1
-7@@ -256,12 +277,10 @@assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2 );free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state); -free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state);/* The pre decrypt function should not modify the buffer, so calling it * again should have the same result */ verdict =tls_pre_decrypt_lite (&tas, &state, &from, &buf);assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2 ); -free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state);/* and buf memory should be equal */ assert_memory_equal (BPTR (&buf), client_reset_v2_tls_auth,sizeof (client_reset_v2_tls_auth));@@ -279,7 +298,6 @@assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_INVALID );free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state); -free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state);/* Wrong key direction gives a wrong hmac key and should not validate */ free_key_ctx_bi (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi);free_tas (&tas);@@ -319,15 +337,12 @@assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2 );free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state); -free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state);buf_reset_len (&buf);buf_write (&buf, client_reset_v2_tls_crypt,sizeof (client_reset_v2_none)); verdict =tls_pre_decrypt_lite (&tas, &state, &from, &buf);assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2 );free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state); -free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state); -/* This is not a reset packet and should trigger the other response */ buf_reset_len (&buf);buf_write (&buf, client_ack_tls_auth_randomid,sizeof (client_ack_tls_auth_randomid));@@ -405,7 +420,7 @@assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1 );/* This is a valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMAC id*/ -bool valid =check_session_id_hmac (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 ); +bool valid =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 , false);assert_false (valid);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +1
-1@@ -436,7 +451,7 @@ verdict =tls_pre_decrypt_lite (&tas, &state, &from, &buf);assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); -bool valid =check_session_id_hmac (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 ); +bool valid =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 , true);assert_true (valid);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +45
-0@@ -445,6 +460,51 @@hmac_ctx_free (hmac); } +static void +test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack (void **ut_state) +{ +hmac_ctx_t *hmac =session_id_hmac_init (); + +struct link_socket_actual from = {0 }; + from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =AF_INET ; + +struct tls_auth_standalone tas = {0 }; +struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state = {0 }; + +struct buffer buf =alloc_buf (1024 ); +enum first_packet_verdict verdict; + + tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_NONE ; + +buf_reset_len (&buf); +buf_write (&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id,sizeof (client_ack_123_none_random_id)); + + + verdict =tls_pre_decrypt_lite (&tas, &state, &from, &buf); +assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1 ); + +/* should fail because it acks 2 */ +bool valid =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 , true); +assert_false (valid); +free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state); + +/* Try test with the control with a too high message id now */ +buf_reset_len (&buf); +buf_write (&buf, client_control_none_random_id,sizeof (client_control_none_random_id)); + + verdict =tls_pre_decrypt_lite (&tas, &state, &from, &buf); +assert_int_equal (verdict,VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1 ); + +/* should fail because it has message id 2 */ + valid =check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id (&state, &from.dest, hmac,30 , true); +assert_false (valid); + +free_tls_pre_decrypt_state (&state); +free_buf (&buf); +hmac_ctx_cleanup (hmac); +hmac_ctx_free (hmac); +} +static
hmac_ctx_t*init_static_hmac(void)
{tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +14
-10@@ -634,16 +694,20 @@main (void) {openvpn_unit_test_setup (); -const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {cmocka_unit_test (test_tls_decrypt_lite_none), -cmocka_unit_test (test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth), -cmocka_unit_test (test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt), -cmocka_unit_test (test_parse_ack), -cmocka_unit_test (test_calc_session_id_hmac_static), -cmocka_unit_test (test_verify_hmac_none), -cmocka_unit_test (test_verify_hmac_tls_auth), -cmocka_unit_test (test_generate_reset_packet_plain), -cmocka_unit_test (test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth), -cmocka_unit_test (test_extract_control_message) }; + + const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = { +cmocka_unit_test (test_tls_decrypt_lite_none), +cmocka_unit_test (test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth), +cmocka_unit_test (test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt), +cmocka_unit_test (test_parse_ack), +cmocka_unit_test (test_calc_session_id_hmac_static), +cmocka_unit_test (test_verify_hmac_none), +cmocka_unit_test (test_verify_hmac_tls_auth), +cmocka_unit_test (test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack), +cmocka_unit_test (test_generate_reset_packet_plain), +cmocka_unit_test (test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth), +cmocka_unit_test (test_extract_control_message) + };#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL )
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Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
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Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...>
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Re: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
Am 23.08.25 um 23:28 schrieb Walter Doekes via Openvpn-devel:
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks!
Can we get this backported to 2.6 as well?
https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1184
Arne
[Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveplaisthos has posted comments on this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email )
Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
......................................................................
Patch Set 7:
(1 comment)
File src/openvpn/mudp.c:
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067/comment/3a04bad5_1d964253 :
PS5, Line 163: msg(D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s",
: packet_opcode_name(op), peer);
Quoted 1 line
This debug message may now be incorrect. The packet might have a valid SID, but a wrong packet ID.
Acknowledged
Signature · 17 lines
To view, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=email To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/settings Gerrit-Project: openvpn Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067 Gerrit-PatchSet: 7 Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <[email protected]...> Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <[email protected]...> Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <[email protected]...> Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <[email protected]> Gerrit-Comment-Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2025 11:59:57 +0000 Gerrit-HasComments: Yes Gerrit-Has-Labels: No Comment-In-Reply-To: MaxF <[email protected]...> Gerrit-MessageType: comment